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Instead of burdening commanders to request support and project logistic requirements, "push" logistics dependable support.
Arguably, the "pull" procedure is efficient and the "push" procedure is effective, which adds to the dilemma of the commander relying on solely one procedure. "Marine logistics traditionally employs a combination of both an as-required basis and are distributed using the "pull"
procedure. The responsibility is on the supported unit, the requesting unit.
There are two distribution methods used to deliver resources to the supported unit: supply point distribution and unit distribution. Supply point distribution involves resources staged at a base or supply point requiring the Therefore, every distribution means was exhausted via motor transportation, assault support, and air delivery.
Unfortunately, once combat power required maintenance and battlefield casualties increased, the demand for "pull" support circulated. The brevity of transition had an adverse effect upon delivery means because the personnel and equipment were limited and already employed with "push" resources that were ongoing. During operations, "push" and "pull" resources competed for distribution and this hindered logistic tempo and sustainment. Pure "push" convoys and shipments were unable to tailor with "pull" resources such as repair parts and medical supplies. Once the transition from combat operations to stabilization operation occurred, demand generated logistics' deficiencies accumulated and its effects on combat power 9 MCDP 4, 67.
proved damaging.
Recommendation and new concepts
To counteract these instances, one agency should govern distribution means, procedures, and methods. Having dedicated distribution assets for "push" resources is understandable for initial and routine sustainment, however, "pull" resources should have prescribed lift when necessary. Ultimately, convoys and shipments should be tailored across the spectrum of goods and services, both push and demand-pull resources.
Concepts such as seabasing propose naval intermodal packaging delivered directly to supported units without dedicated MHE and line haul capabilities. The seabasing tenet focuses on a distribution system with tailored loadouts. Loads are also prescribed; they must be small enough to be carried organically by the support unit and large enough to support any adjustments or delays in the resupply cycle. Routine resupply cycles will be twenty-four hours, however the length of the cycles and the on hand stockage levels may be adjusted to fit the operational situation. 
Command and control in Operation Iraqi Freedom
In OIF, supply support was extremely challenging because of the combat environment and its uncertainty.
Distribution of "brute force" logistics was laborious, but demand-pull logistics, specifically repair part and medical supplies, was unsatisfactory. The command and control system governing and processing demands was a thirty-yearold mainframe bases system called the Asset Tracking
Logistic and Supply System (ATLASS). The legacy supply support system was inadequate. Moreover, two incompatible supply systems were utilized in theater, which created 12 MCDP 4, 68.
interface problems and manual processes work arounds.
Additionally, an inventory system was tested in this austere environment and spawned more time toward analyzing the system's failures instead of meeting the end state of its mission. to Marines. 17 Under the seabasing concept, logistics information from a common relevant operating picture and naval distribution will throughput logistics and prevent dis-connectivity. This IT will align with the programs embedded in the private and public sectors. The system will be incorporated Marine Corps-wide. It will be web-based, customer-friendly, responsive, and acquisition capable.
Finally, GCSS-MC every Marine Corps legacy application will pass through a single portal to interface forming a common language and picture. This development will fill the gap on logistic command and control architecture and improve the supply support system exponentially.
Conclusion
The advancement of theater distribution and command and control architecture will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of supply support.
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